Presidential Selection: A Difference In Opinion by Aylyng, JJ
Seattle Pacific University
Digital Commons @ SPU
Honors Projects University Scholars
Spring June 6th, 2018
Presidential Selection: A Difference In Opinion
JJ Aylyng
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.spu.edu/honorsprojects
Part of the American Politics Commons
This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the University Scholars at Digital Commons @ SPU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ SPU.
Recommended Citation





















FACULTY ADVISOR, DR. REED DAVIS 




A project submitted in partial fulfillment 


















Approved              




 This examination contrasts the views of the Founding Fathers and Woodrow 
Wilson on the matter of how the President of the United States of America ought to be 
selected. While Wilson is commendable for his vision of empowering the rank-and-file to 
select their president through direct national primaries, his views directly conflict with 
those of the Founders. This purpose of this essay is to spark an interest in the political 
thought of United States presidential selection and in political theory in general. This 
analysis acknowledges the fact that the Founders were deceased long before Wilson 
wrote on this topic. For the sake of simplicity, the reader is asked to kindly overlook the 
anachronistic nature of this essay featuring the Founder directly addressing Wilson’s 
ideas. Male pronouns will be used throughout this essay for the sake of simplicity and 
because both the Founders and Wilson used those pronouns when writing about United 
States politics. While there are different types of political parties, such as local or state 











PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: A DIFFERENCE IN OPINION 
 Highly dissatisfied with the method of presidential selection in his time, 
Woodrow Wilson called for a reform of the presidential selection system, articulating his 
own vision for how the United States president should be selected. By Wilson’s time, the 
method of presidential selection had already been changed twice over from that of the 
Founders. The passage of the 12th amendment brought the first change and Martin Van 
Burn’s deliberate efforts to create a party system brought the second change. Wilson’s 
method for selecting the president differs from the method of the Founders in three 
significant ways. Firstly, Wilson’s proposal for a direct national primary system does not 
resemble the elector method that the Founders established in the Constitution. Secondly, 
Wilson argued that there should not be an aristocratic class from which the president 
would be selected. Instead, Wilson desired that a common man with political experience 
would be selected as president. Thirdly, Wilson’s plan endorses informal political parties, 
which goes against the intentions of the Founders for United States politics to be 
nonpartisan. 
SECTION 1 
 The first deviation between the Founding Fathers and Woodrow Wilson on the 
topic of selecting the president was the method of selection itself. In contrast to Wilson’s 
method of direct national primaries, the Founders’ method used electors to vote for 
presidential candidates. The Founders’ plan for selecting the president was written into 
Article II of the Constitution. Under this plan, each state would select a number of 
electors equal to the number of senators and house representatives to that which the state 
held (U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2). The electors would each have two votes (U.S. 
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Constitution, art 2, sec. 3). At least one of these two votes had to be for a candidate from 
outside the elector’s own state (U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3). It was not a majority of 
the electoral votes cast that would select a candidate but rather a candidate needed to 
have a majority of the number of electors voting for him in order for him to win the 
election (U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3). In the case of a tie between candidates that got 
more than a majority of the electors voting for them, the House of Representatives would 
choose from those tied candidates (U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3). If no candidate 
received more than a majority of elector votes, then each state in the House would have 
one vote to vote for a candidate, with a victory requiring the majority of all the states 
(U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3).  
 Moreover, Hamilton (Federalist 68 [1788] 2009, 392) wrote that the electors 
would not gather together at a national convention but instead each elector would vote in 
their own state. Paul Eidelberg (1968, 185) points out that the lack of national convention 
prevents electors from knowing how the electors in other states voted. This would 
decrease the likelihood of collusion and corruption, making it so that electors would vote 
for the candidate they sincerely thought was the best candidate. Additionally, all states 
vote on the same day, preventing news of how one state voted from reaching another 
before the electors of a particular state vote. The logic behind the argument that electors 
are prevented from colluding with each other due to the lack of a national convention and 
the fact that electors vote on the same day is that the electors cannot collude with each 
other if they are not certain how other electors voted. Additionally, the identities of the 
electors would be unknown to presidential candidates (Eidelberg 1968, 190). This is 
significant because once elected, the president would not be indebted to the electors 
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because he would not know whom was responsible for his victory (Eidelberg 1968, 187). 
This lack of indebtedness would allow the president to avoid a conflict of interest once he 
begins serving as president.  
 As James W. Ceaser ([1979] 1980, 43) points out, just how democratic the elector 
method would be depends on the discretion of each state. Under the plan written in 
Article II of the Constitution, it is possible for the states to allow the electors to vote for 
the president without any deference to the people’s choice or for the electors to vote as 
the people decided that the electors would vote (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 43). An 
arrangement in between these two extremes is also permissible (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 43). 
Regardless of how the electors are to vote, the states would nominate the electors 
(Eidelberg 1968, 184-185). The state would have the option of allowing its people to 
choose the electors from these nominees (Eidelberg 1968, 184-185). If the state did not 
allow the people to choose from the nominees, then the state would choose the electors 
from the nominees.  
 Wilson could critique the Founders’ selection method by pointing to the 
possibility of the House of Representatives deciding the election. Wilson could argue that 
the problem with a House selection is twofold. The first problem is that the leaders in the 
House keep their motives and principles hidden (Wilson 1897, 352). Wilson would not 
put faith in the House to pick the best president possible because he thought its motives 
were hidden from outsiders, leading to corruption. Thus if the House decided the election, 
the House would select a president sympathetic to its selfish interests rather than to the 
interests of the people. The second problem Wilson (1897, 349) would have with a House 
selection is that even if the House genuinely did promote the interests of the people rather 
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than its own interests, different local interests fragment the country. A state’s House 
Representatives represent the interests of their constituents ([1879] 1925, 30) but 
selecting the best president possible requires House Representatives to look past the 
unique interests of their state to the good of the nation as a whole. Wilson’s critique 
would question whether it would be possible for a House Representative to do their duty 
to represent their state’s interests while simultaneously having the independence 
necessary to elect the best possible president. 
 The Founders would counter that a House election is not a likely possibility and is 
merely a safeguard in case there was a tie among candidates that got more than a majority 
of the electors voting for them or if no candidate received more than a majority of elector 
votes. The Founders would assert that a House decision is unlikely because the electors 
would be motivated to elect a president due to fear of a House election (Ceaser [1979] 
1980, 80). The electors would fear this possibility because it would mean that the electors 
would lose their own power to elect a president (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 80). Therefore, the 
electors would make great efforts to avoid a House selection, lessening the likelihood of a 
House election.  
 Wilson would respond that this solution is nonsensical. Wilson (1916, 20) would 
point out that electors meet in different states to elect the president and as a result, there is 
no gathering together of electors. As mentioned above, since the electors do not all meet 
together, they would not have any way of knowing how other electors voted (Eidelberg 
1968, 185). As a result of this isolation, electors would not be able to strategize on how to 
broker an arrangement with each other that would avoid a House election of the 
president. The Founders may respond that the electors are not prohibited from 
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strategizing with each other prior to the state conventions on how to avoid a House 
selection. This is so because the Constitution does not say whether or not electors know 
the identities of other electors. If the states decide to publicize the names of its electors, 
the electors are not prohibited from corresponding with each other to strategize to avoid a 
House election.  
 Wilson could respond by mentioning Edward Stanwood’s ([1884] 1928, 14) point 
that the electors may be corrupt. If the states publicize the names of its electors prior to 
the state conventions, corrupt electors can collude before the state conventions to elect a 
specific candidate in order to gain monetary or other illicit benefits. The Founders could 
respond with Stanwood’s ([1884] 1928, 14) solution to this predicament: states can 
choose morally good people as electors, avoiding the problem of illicit cooperation.  
 Wilson could counter that the ambition to select only the morally upright as electors is 
not a failsafe method of avoiding elector corruption because people’s motives are not 
visible. In other words, an elector could appear to be morally upright but secretly have 
corrupt motives. Once selected as an elector, this secretly corrupt elector could pursue his 
own selfish motives, undermining the legitimacy of the presidential selection process. 
 The Founders might counter that corruption is a problem of every political system 
and the fact that electors in each state vote entirely independently of electors in other 
states at least lessens the possibility of collusion because the electors cannot collude with 
each other at a national convention. The Founders recognized that reputation and merit do 
not always go hand-in-hand but they thought that reputation was the best indicator of 
merit (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 66). The Founders could argue that it might be difficult for an 
illicit person to gain a reputation for being a morally sound character because uncouth 
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actions are difficult to keep secret, perhaps especially in politics where political 
opponents are consistently searching for something unflattering to publicize about their 
rivals. 
 Wilson also objects to the Founders’ electoral method because it lacks a national 
convention. For Wilson (1916, 20), the lack of a national convention is a deficiency of 
the Founders’ method because a national convention provides a forum for final debate on 
the merits of the candidates. The Founders could respond in two ways. Firstly, they may 
put forth that the lack of national convention helps address Wilson’s concern about 
corruption in the government. The second is that a national convention is not necessary in 
order for there to be sufficient debate about which candidate would be the best president.  
 The Founders may argue that under Wilson’s own viewpoint, the fact that the 
electors do not meet in a national convention ought to be considered a merit of the 
Founder’s method. Even the most haphazard reading of Wilson’s The New Freedom 
illuminates Wilson’s concern about corruption and undue influence in government. The 
Founders would perhaps argue that by making it so that electors meet in separate states, it 
would help avoid the very things that Wilson disdains in politics: corruption, unjust 
scheming, and illicit deal-making. The Founders could argue that since electors do not 
meet together at a national convention, it would make it more difficult for electors to 
collude as part of an unjust machination. 
 The Founders may further defend their method by arguing there even if there is no 
national convention, there might still be sufficient debate about which candidate would 
be the best president. The Founders could argue that while a national convention would 
provide a venue for debate, there are other venues of debate that would allow for 
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comprehensive discourse. This would be the case if the states decided to publicize the 
identities of their electors prior to the state conventions. The Constitution does not deny 
states the right to do so. With the publication of elector identities, electors would be able 
to correspond with each other to engage in debate and discourse on the merits of the 
various candidates. Even if the states did not disclose the identities of the electors, it is 
possible for there to be extensive discussions among government officials and political 
figures on the merits of the various candidates. Thus the Founders would argue that a 
national convention is not necessary for there to be adequate debate and discourse on the 
topic of which candidate would be the best president.  
 Another way that Wilson could critique the Founders’ selection method is by 
mentioning Edward Stanwood’s ([1884] 1928, 4) point that the best people would not be 
able to be electors. Stanwood ([1884] 1928, 4) pointed out that a problem with the 
electoral method devised by the Founders is that the best political personnel from each 
state would be not able to serve as electors because the Constitution reads: “no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, 
shall be appointed an Elector” (U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 1). Stanwood’s ([1884] 
1928, 4) point is that the best people of each state would already be senators, 
representatives, and state governors. Therefore the electors would not be the best people 
of each state (Stanwood [1884] 1928, 4) possibly leading to these suboptimal people not 
having the judgment necessary to select the best possible president. The Founders could 
respond that even if the electors were not the absolute best of the people of each state, the 
electors would be able to still elect the best candidate for president. To use an analogy, a 
 9 
student can still get a perfect score on an exam even if that student has not historically 
been among the best scoring students in the class. 
 In contrast to the elector method of the Founders, Wilson wanted the people to 
directly vote for the president. Wilson ([1913] 1961, 81) thought that it was essential that 
every interest and the perspective of every person be considered. Directly voting for the 
president would serve as an unfiltered way for people to communicate their interests. 
Wilson’s ([1913] 1961, 60) method for fulfilling his desire to represent the people’s 
interests was direct national primaries.  
 Wilson’s method of presidential selection is based on the goal of restoring the 
power of the common people in the government. For Wilson, the government belongs to 
the people ([1913] 1961, 57) and should represent the interests of all people ([1913] 
1961, 131). Wilson ([1913] 1961, 31, 49) argued that Washington is not being ruled by 
the people but rather is being controlled by special interests. According to Wilson, the 
fact that there were indirect and private ways to influence legislation allowed party 
machines to emerge ([1913] 1961, 75). Political power became concentrated in the hands 
of the party machines (Wilson 1910, 591) and as a result, party machines decide what 
policies are implemented. Party bosses are the heads of these machines because 
politicians are dependent on the favor of these bosses in order to be appointed (Wilson 
1910, 591). Party machines are an affront to the just workings of government because a 
party boss promotes his selfish interests instead of the interests of the people (Wilson 
[1913] 1961, 133-134).  
 For Wilson, the solution to this state of affairs is to establish accountability 
through direct primaries. Direct national primaries would establish a direct link between 
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the people and the president, avoiding the selfish influence of party machines. For Wilson 
([1913] 1961, 56), political leaders are not to judge for the nation but are to listen to the 
people and then to act as the spokespersons of the people. Since direct national primaries 
cause the president to be directly elected by the people, the president will be accountable 
to the people. In Wilson’s system, party conventions would announce the winners of the 
primaries and articulate a party platform (Wilson 1913). Even though there would be 
party conventions in Wilson’s system, the candidate elected as president would be based 
entirely on the results of the direct national primaries.  
 One reason the Founders would oppose Wilson’s direct national primaries is due 
to their suspicion of popular election, which direct national primaries are a type of. If 
Wilson were to look back to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, he would find an ally 
in Gouverneur Morris but he would find that as a group, the Founders were strongly 
opposed to popular election. For example, Hamilton, Jay, and Madison had a distrust of 
popular elections (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 46). At the Constitutional Convention on July 
17th of 1787, Morris called for the president to be directly elected by the people 
(Eidelberg 1968, 173). That same day when voted on, this proposal was defeated, with 
nine states opposing it and only Morris’ home state of Pennsylvania supporting it 
(Eidelberg 1968, 173). On August 24th, the convention voted on two measures 
(Wilmerding 1958, 12-13). The first was to have an election of the president directly by 
the people and the second was to have the state electors of the president be directly 
selected by the people (Wilmerding 1958, 12-13). The first measure was defeated with 
nine states voting against it and two states voting for it (Wilmerding 1958, 13). The 
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second measure was defeated with six states voting against it and five states voting for it 
(Wilmerding 1958, 13).  
 The results of these votes exemplify Paul Stanwood’s ([1884] 1928, 3) assertion 
that at the Constitutional Convention, there was no time when the concept of a popular 
election was held in overall favor. The fact that a popular election was never held in 
overall favor demonstrates that the Founders were opposed to popular election. Since 
Wilson’s direct national primaries are a form of popular election, the Founders would 
reject his method as a legitimate one to select the president.  
 One concern the founders had about popular election was that it would give large 
states an advantage (Stanwood [1884] 1928, 3). Hugh Williamson put forth that it was 
certain that large states would enjoy an unfair advantage in popular elections because 
each state would likely favor a candidate of its own and that it would be unlikely for the 
whole nation to form around a single candidate (Wilmerding 1958, 11). Roger Sherman 
shared these sentiments (Eidelberg 1968, 173). Charles Pinckney pointed out that larger 
states have greater amounts of voters so the voters in large states would sway the election 
in favor of larger states (Eidelberg 1968, 179). 
 Wilson would counter that is not inconceivable that the nation as a whole could 
come to support a single candidate. The Founders would counter that Wilson’s optimism 
of voters seeing past their own unique interests to the interests of the nation as a whole is 
far from certain. For example, Madison (Federalist 10 [1788] 2009, 46) famously wrote 
that “Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly 
expires”. With these words, Madison puts forth the point that a free society is a 
fragmented one, where different people pursue different interests. Sometimes these 
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interests conflict with the interests of others. Since people have their own interests, the 
Founders would question Wilson’s opinion that people will look past their own interests 
to look to the good of the nation as a whole.  
 The Founders would also object to Wilson’s method with the argument that the 
people may not have the education necessary to choose the best candidate for president. 
They would find Wilson’s direct national primaries especially problematic because there 
would be no moderating influence on the will of the people in the case that the people do 
not choose to support the best candidate possible. The Founders valued the education of 
the people and thought that education was a great mechanism for the continuation of 
liberty and the operation of the nation. Jefferson (1942, 89) put forth that it is by 
education that the people can preserve their freedom and happiness. For Jefferson, 
education was to make the people capable of making the best possible selection of public 
officials (Mansfield [1971] 2011, 65). Another founder, Benjamin Rush said that 
education had the ability to cultivate within the people, the republican sentiments 
necessary for the continuation of the republic (Wood 1969, 426-427).  
 While the Founders had faith in the transformation of people that education 
brings, they would argue that Wilson’s method of direct national primaries presupposes, 
without prior justification, that the people would be educated enough to continually select 
the best candidate for president. In order to be more accepting of the people directly 
electing the president, the Founders would want to see evidence that the people would be 
educated enough to make the best choice possible. They would object to Wilson’s plan 
because Wilson does not provide sufficient evidence that such is the case.  
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 Another objection that the Founders would have to Wilson’s system is that even if 
the people had the capability to choose the best candidate for the executive office, it does 
not follow that they would actually do so. They could argue that people have many time 
commitments and may not have the time to properly analyze all the candidates to the 
extent necessary to make the best selection possible. Other voters may not be energetic 
enough to make the effort to vigorously analyze candidates to the extent they should. 
Wilson ([1913] 1961, 81) admits that people are sometimes too lazy or busy to vote at 
primary elections but he insists that when they do vote, the people are effective decision 
makers ([1913] 1961, 137). The Founders would counter that the mere fact that the 
people are effective at voting wisely when they do choose to vote is an insufficient 
remedy to the problem of the people not voting.  
 The Founders would further object to Wilson’s direct national primaries by 
arguing that the result of the election would not necessarily reflect the true choice of the 
people. If the people do not have the proper amount of time or energy to properly analyze 
candidates, the consequence would be that some people will vote for candidates that upon 
further analysis, they would not have chosen to vote for. Thus, when a president is 
selected, he might be merely the candidate who was able to be victorious based on the 
time and energy that voters were able to commit to analyzing the various candidates 
rather than be the true representative of the people’s will.  
 The Founders would also point out that that voters might be apathetic and might 
not have the attention span required to make the best possible choice for president. The 
Founders would point out that if only a minority cared enough to vote for presidential 
candidates, a candidate would need only a minority of votes to become elected. This 
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would make it so that the victorious candidate is not the choice of the will of the people at 
large but is rather only the choice of a minority, a far cry from Wilson’s ([1913] 1961, 
81) desire to have every interest represented in the election. The Founders would charge 
that Wilson’s plan is founded on the assumption that the people will consistently be 
interested enough in presidential selection to make the best choice possible but the 
Founders would assert that such an assumption is far from a certainty.  
 Wilson would counter that ignorance, lack of time or energy to properly study 
candidates, and apathy on the part of the people are problems for all electoral systems and 
are not problems idiosyncratic to his method. While the Founders would not disagree, 
they would point out that their system accounts for these problems because the state 
electors would strive to wisely select the president even if the people do not. Wilson may 
counter by arguing that if educated properly, people would have the judgment necessary 
to vote for the best possible candidate, possess the time-management skills necessary to 
sufficiently analyze candidates, and would care enough to participate in electing the 
president. The Founders could respond that given how much responsibility Wilson places 
in the hands of the people, Wilson ought to have a detailed education plan to prepare the 
people to adequately carry out such a major duty. Until they studied such a plan and were 
convinced that it could be implemented, the Founders would continue to object to 
Wilson’s direct national primaries on the grounds that the primaries place too much 
power in the hands of the people.  
 Wilson ([1913] 1961, 52) would counter that even without a formal political 
education, the people will be responsible in their selection of the president because their 
self-interest depends on it. Wilson ([1913] 1961, 52) argued that the people would be 
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responsible in selecting the president because if they are reckless or vengeful, they will 
hurt themselves. The Founders would agree with James W. Ceaser’s ([1979] 1980, 65) 
point that even if the people have good intentions, it does not follow that the people will 
be able to choose wisely. The Founders could argue that Wilson’s counterargument fails 
to consider that people have biases, make decisions based on emotions, and possess 
imperfect reason. The Founders would agree with Harry Jaffa’s (1961,72) observation 
that nature “endows us with passions which, in the pursuit of our peculiar attachments, 
bias our judgment and corrupt our integrity”. Due to the fact that voters’ judgment is 
flawed, the Founders would find unpersuasive the argument that a public without a 
formal political education would have the ability to choose the best president possible.  
 Another way that the Founders might respond to Wilson’s method of direct 
national primaries is by arguing that even if the people directly elected the president, it 
would make only a marginal difference in advancing Wilson’s goal of furthering the 
interests of the people in the government. This is so because the power of the executive 
office is limited. With the system of checks and balances that are in place in government, 
the executive and legislative branches restrain each other. Wilson (1897, 341) 
acknowledges this circumstance, putting forth that the president cannot lead effectively 
since he does not have enough power compared to how much power Congress has and 
Congress opposes the president for its own selfish interests. Under Wilson’s ([1879] 
1925) analysis, the president is merely the executor of the legislative will. In order to 
change this circumstance, Wilson’s method of direct national primaries goes hand-in-
hand with strengthening the power of the executive. Wilson would respond to Founders’ 
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critique by arguing that by strengthening the power of the executive office, the president 
would be empowered to act for the good of the nation. 
 The Founders would counter this response by arguing that Wilson’s method of 
direct election concomitantly calls for the diminution of checks and balances, violating 
the fundamental nature of the government. Wilson ([1908], 1947, 56-57) admits to 
having a Darwinian approach to the structure of the government, saying that it ought to 
be able to adapt to the times.  Wilson ([1908] 1947, 56-57) calls for the erosion of the 
system of checks and balances, arguing that the government ought to act more in unison 
so that it can respond to the challenges of the age. The purpose of this erosion would be 
to enable the president to be more of a director of the nation so that the president would 
be able to act for the good of the nation (Wilson [1908] 1947, 81). 
  One reason the Founders established a government with checks and balances was 
to prevent the president from being too powerful. As Ceaser ([1979] 1980, 189) pointed 
out, a powerful president who is revered can use his position to influence the people in 
the way that he wishes. Thus a powerful president could use his influence for his own 
gain at the expense of the common good. This possibility would horrify the Founders. 
The Founders would agree with Martin Diamond, Winston Mills Fisk, and Herbert 
Garfinkel’s ([1966] 1970, 215) observation that history is full of examples of tyrannical 
regimes, such as the tyrants in ancient Greece, the reign of Julius Caesar at the expense of 
the Roman Republic, and King George III’s treatment of the American colonies. The 
Founders wanted to avoid anything resembling these trespasses on liberty in the United 
States. This concern motivated them to divide the national government into three distinct 
branches with checks and balances on each other. Therefore Wilson’s empowerment of 
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the president at the expense of checks and balances goes strongly against the will of the 
Founders. 
 The Founders could also critique Wilson’s method of direct national primaries by 
agreeing with Ceaser’s ([1979] 1980, 182) point that if the president owes his election 
entirely to the people, the president would be too weak to act effectively for the good of 
the nation. One reason why the Founders were concerned about a president being too 
weak was they wanted the president to restrain the influence of a seditious House of 
Representatives (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 51). For example, the Founders wanted the 
president to be able to withstand the influence of the House in case a demagogue 
assumed control of the House (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 51).  
 The Founders also wanted for the executive to act in the best interest of the 
country even in the face of unwarranted opposition from the people (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 
50). The Founders would argue that because Wilson’s system makes the election of the 
executive depend solely on the people, the president would be inhibited from acting for 
the good of the nation. This is so because if the president’s actions were in great enough 
contrast to the people’s desires, he would risk his re-election or cause the people to 
question his legitimacy as a leader. The Founders would argue that if the president is 
entirely dependent on the will of the people to become elected, it would compromise his 
ability to act in the best interest of the nation because he would owe his election entirely 
to the people, creating a conflict of interest.  
 Wilson could counter that the Founders’ critique presupposes a deviation of 
opinion between the executive and the people. Wilson’s argument would be that if the 
people elected the president, both the people and the president would of one mind 
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because the people would only elect a candidate that would represent their interests. As a 
result, the contrast between the president’s will and the people’s will would not be so 
distinct as to cause friction between the president and the people. This lack of friction 
would avoid the situation of a president trying to carry out the will of the people while 
attempting to act for the good of the nation. This is so because the president would 
consider the good of the nation to be the same as the will of the people and vice-versa. 
The Founders could respond by suggesting that even if the president and people were of 
one mind when the president was elected, either the mind of the president or that of the 
people would be subject to change at some point after the president has resumed office. 
In other words, an agreement today does not guarantee an agreement tomorrow. The 
Founders would then argue that their critique still holds.  
 One concern the Founders would have about direct national primaries is that it 
allows a demagogue a straight and clear path into the executive office (Ceaser 1979, 65-
66, 71). The Founders would state that, under Wilson’s method, there is no mechanism to 
moderate the people’s choice in case the people chose to elect a demagogue. All the 
demagogue has to accomplish to gain the executive office is to get enough votes. 
Demagoguery was a major concern to the Founders. For example, John Adams ([2000], 
237) wrote: “Self-interest, private avidity, ambition, and avarice, will exist in every state 
of society, and under every form of government”. With these words, Adams pointed to 
the fact that any system of government, which would include its method of selecting its 
leaders, ought to be evaluated on how well it responds to private selfish interests. Thus 
for the Founders, a political system ought to have a clear answer to solving the problem 
of selfish ambition, a problem which finds itself especially personified by the 
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demagogue. The Founders would be concerned that Wilson’s direct national primaries 
would provide an opportunity for the silvered tongued or charismatic demagogue to gain 
the presidency with no mechanism to stop him from doing so. 
 Wilson would respond to this critique by arguing that the concern of 
demagoguery is a concern of any election system, and not a concern peculiar to his 
method. The Founders would respond that Wilson’s rebuttal neglects to acknowledge that 
this weakness is especially poignant in Wilson’s method because direct national 
primaries provide no mechanism or additional voices to moderate the choice of the 
people. Wilson would argue that while direct national primaries would not stop a 
demagogue from ascending to the executive office if elected, this concern is unnecessary 
because the demagogue can be identified before he is elected. Once the demagogue is 
identified, the people would not vote for the demagogue, preventing him from becoming 
elected.  
 Wilson’s first method to identify a demagogue is that the demagogue utilizes 
evanescent public passions while the legitimate candidate appeals to a longstanding 
thought (Wilson [1890] 1952, 42). The Founders could argue that a problem with this 
technique is that the demagogue may appeal to some long-standing prejudice in addition 
to or rather than momentary compulsions of the people. In fact, a long-standing issue or 
prejudice would perhaps be the perfect thing for a demagogue to exploit in order to gain 
popular appeal. The Founders would argue that issue arousal, regardless of how recent 
the issue happens to be, is problematic for Wilson’s method because a demagogue can 
take advantage of the public’s stance on an issue.  
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  Wilson’s second method for identifying the demagogue is that the demagogue is 
someone that commits any act that permanently divides economic or sociological groups 
within society (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 194). The Founders could challenge this technique 
by arguing that it precludes the possibility that there may be a legitimate permanent 
grievance against an economic or sociological group within society. For example, the 
Founders would likely argue for the legitimacy of United States society being 
permanently poised against the influence of those connected to the purse of King George 
III from interfering in the formation of United States legislation or government processes. 
Thus the Founders would question the validity of Wilson’s technique for identifying the 
demagogue because a non-demagogue could legitimately commit an act that permanently 
divides economic or sociological groups within society. The Founders would argue that 
since both a demagogue and a non-demagogue could carry out a divisive act, the mere 
occurrence of an act that permanently divides society does not help identify the 
demagogue.  
 A third technique devised by Wilson in order to identify a demagogue is to 
examine what a candidate can gain from ascending to the executive office (Ceaser [1979] 
1980, 194-195). According to Wilson, a candidate is likely to be a demagogue if the 
candidate’s only goal is to gain or add to his own power (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 194-195). 
The Founders would critique this technique by putting forth that what a candidate seeks 
to gain from the executive office is not always clear because people’s private thoughts are 
not public knowledge. The allure of power for its own sake, for instance, is privately 
known to a candidate but is not public knowledge. Therefore Founders could argue that 
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Wilson’s technique to identify the demagogue is not useful because it is unknown to 
voters just what the candidates seek to gain by winning the executive office.       
 Wilson would likely respond to the Founder’s critiques of his methods of 
identifying the demagogue by arguing that the Founders’ elector method is not a 
satisfactory solution to the problem of a demagogue gaining the executive office. While 
the election method of the Founders has electors voting for the president, Wilson could 
point out Ceaser’s ([1979] 1980, 43) observation that a state may decide to have its 
electors vote as directed by the people. This would have the same practical effect as a 
direct national primary because the electors would not influence the election in any way. 
Therefore if a demagogue ran for president and the people directed the electors to vote 
for the demagogue, the electors would be helpless to resist the will of the people and 
would be forced to vote for the demagogue. 
 The Founders could respond that as long as some states had its electors be 
unfettered by the will of the people, those electors could vote against the demagogue, 
lessening the chance of the demagogue being victorious. The only way that the Founders’ 
elector method could have the same practical effect of a direct national primary system is 
if every state made it so that its electors could only vote as the people directed them to 
vote. Since this scenario is so unlikely, the Founders would put forth that their system is 
still a better guard against a demagogue gaining the executive office than Wilson’s 
system is. 
 To support his argument that the Founders’ electoral method does not fully 
resolve the problem of a demagogue gaining the executive office, Wilson could also point 
to Eidelberg’s (1968, 184-185) observation that the state may allow the people to chose 
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the electors from those that the state nominates. This would allow the people to select as 
nominees those most sympathetic to the people’s interests, making it so the distinction 
between the will of the people and the will of the elector is lessened. If the people favor a 
demagogue and chose as an elector someone that wants to vote according to the will of 
the people or if that elector himself favors the demagogue, then the elector will vote for 
the demagogue. This situation would undermine the Founders’ intention for the electors 
to moderate the choice of the people.  
 The Founders could respond to this argument in two ways. The first is that even if 
electors in one state vote for a demagogue, the electors in other states may choose to 
support other candidates, lessening the chance of the demagogue being victorious. The 
second is that even if the people choose the electors from those that the state nominates, 
the state is still the organization that selects the nominees. As a result, a state can choose 
wise, upright people as its nominees. Thus regardless of which nominees the people 
chose to select as electors, those chosen electors will be wise in their judgment. This 
wisdom in judgment will allow the electors to choose to vote for other candidates that are 
not demagogues.  
SECTION 2  
 The next major point of disagreement between the Founding Fathers and 
Woodrow Wilson is on whether there ought to be aristocracy from which the president 
would be selected. For the Founders, a statesman from an educated class with an 
established reputation of service to the state would be the best suited to be president 
(Ceaser [1979] 1980, 47). This person would be a refined gentleman of high education 
and attitudes (Wood 1969, 480), qualifying him to be a member of the aristocracy. The 
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aristocracy would be based on talent and merit, not heredity (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 47). 
For the Founders, the president and other political leaders ought to be selected from this 
aristocracy (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 47). For Wilson (1985, 170), the person best suited to be 
president would be a common man with political experience. Wilson ([1913] 1961, 59, 
62) was against the aristocratic theory because he thought that no aristocracy would have 
as accurate a vision of true reality as the common man. For Wilson, the candidate best 
qualified to be the president would be the one who best represents the will of the people 
(Ceaser [1979] 1980, 187). 
 For the Founders, the common man was not the best qualified to serve the country 
as its president. Hamilton (Federalist 35 [1788] 2009, 186-187) wrote that the landholder 
will seek to promote the interest of property and the merchant will be inclined to promote 
the interests of the manufacturing arts to which mercantilism is closely aligned. However, 
the learned man will be impartial to different commercial concerns, instead looking to the 
interests of society as a whole (Hamilton Federalist 35 [1788] 2009, 187). This learned 
man would be a member of the aristocracy.  
 The Founders were in favor of an aristocracy that the president would be selected 
from (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 47). This individual that was selected as president would be 
someone with a great reputation that had been earned from prior state service (Ceaser 
[1979] 1980, 58). The Founders were against hierarchies based on royalism and 
hereditary ties (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 47). For example, John Adams (2000, 130) wrote 
that while there are different orders of offices, there are not different orders of men. 
Instead, all men are of the same species (Adams 2000, 130). For the Founders, the 
distinguishing factor between those in the aristocracy and those that were not would be 
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talent and merit (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 47). By gaining a distinguished record of state 
service, persons would earn their right to be a part of the aristocracy (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 
58). The logic of the Founders for their support of selecting a president from the 
aristocracy is that in the same way that an experienced surgeon ought to be the one 
selected to perform a complicated surgery, so too should someone with distinguished 
experience to the state hold such a significant office as the presidency. On the matter of 
presidential selection, the purpose of the aristocracy was to provide a supply of men from 
which a suitable president could be drawn. 
 An observation that the Founders could make in support of their argument of the 
desirability of an aristocracy is that it would assuage the problem of needing to finance a 
campaign. With an aristocracy established, candidates would already be well-known and 
enjoy a reputation, lessening their need to spend money on name recognition and self-
promotion. An aristocracy based on talent and merit would level the playing field 
between wealthy candidates and candidates of modest means because candidates would 
be praised and valued to the extent of their political contributions rather than for the size 
of their personal coffers.  
 Wilson would critique the idea of an aristocracy by arguing that it will create an 
elite class of persons who pursue their own selfish interests at the expense of the interests 
of the people. Wilson ([1913] 1961, 53, 75) would make this criticism because the 
problem of a political group that looked out only for its own selfish interests is precisely 
what Wilson believed was happening in his own time with party machines. Wilson could 
charge that the members of the aristocracy would justify each other’s actions and prevent 
others from outside the group from gaining significant governmental roles. All the while, 
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the group would pretend to be seeking the interests of the people while actually 
promoting their own selfish interests. Wilson could charge that members of the 
aristocracy would perpetuate this injustice by defaming any critics by accusing these 
critics of having an insufficient education or impure motives.  
 The Founders could defend their conception of the aristocracy by arguing that the 
aristocracy is unlikely to become corrupted because it continually accepts new members. 
As Gordon Wood (1969, 479-480) pointed out, social movement into the aristocracy was 
possible. Jefferson (1942, 89) declared that genius youths may be among the poor 
because nature sows talents among both poor and rich. With this declaration, Jefferson 
exemplified the Founders’ sentiments that talent and merit are the measures of the 
political man and so the aristocracy should be open to new members. The Founders could 
argue that with the aristocracy’s openness to new members joining, the inflow of new 
talent would put a check on the likelihood of the aristocracy of becoming isolated and 
focused on its own insular interests.  
 Another criticism that Wilson could levy against the Founders’ aristocracy is that 
its reliance on reputation is problematic because there may be a discrepancy between a 
person’s merit and a person’s reputation. The aristocracy is to be composed of highly 
educated men with an established record of state service but Wilson might charge that the 
aristocracy would decline in quality because those joining it may do so by having a 
reputation that they do not legitimately deserve. Wilson could also argue that a member 
of the aristocracy might be someone that once deserved their reputation for greatness but 
had lost it through time and a lack of practice, leading to a decline in the aristocracy’s 
quality. The Founders would not deny the possibility of these occurrences but due to the 
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fact that merit itself is invisible, the Founders relied on reputation as the best indicator of 
merit (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 66). The Founders could respond to this critique by arguing 
that it could be difficult for a person to gain a reputation that exceeds their merit. The 
Founders could also respond that a person would, over time, lose their reputation for 
greatness if this person ceased to be politically active in a rigorous capacity.  
 Wilson could argue that an additional deficiency of the Founders’ desire for an 
aristocracy class is that even if an aristocracy was instituted, there is no guarantee that it 
would have a steady enough enrollment of members to sustain itself. In articulating this 
argument Wilson could make use of Ceaser’s ([1979] 1980, 84) observation that the 
Founding itself and the Revolutionary War gave men an excellent opportunity to 
distinguish themselves upon the national stage but these events are not repeatable. Wilson 
could charge that because the Founders’ planned for the existence of an aristocracy, they 
ought to have provided a satisfactory amount of opportunities for people to distinguish 
themselves enough to join the aristocracy.  
 The Founders could defend themselves from this charge by arguing that even in 
uneventful political times, men can still distinguish themselves enough to join the 
aristocracy by doing an excellent job at their duties in political roles. Wilson could 
further argue that for any variety of reasons, such as apathy towards politics, there may 
be a lack of people willing to join the aristocracy. The Founders might respond that there 
would be a steady supply of men to rise to be great statesmen because universities would 
inculcate in the youth a proper political education along with a desire to carry out their 
civic duties as political officials. For example, one reason Thomas Jefferson founded the 
University of Virginia was to educate future statesmen (Jaffa 1961, 80).  
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 Wilson could argue that an additional problem of the Founders’ plan is the 
ambiguity on the precise qualifications one must meet to join the aristocracy. What is 
distinguished service? Is there a number of years that a candidate must serve in some 
capacity to be properly considered a great enough statesman to join the aristocracy? How 
will disagreements be resolved on the matter of which records of political persons are 
sufficient enough for these persons to be qualified to join the aristocracy? By asking these 
and other questions, Wilson could argue that it is unclear exactly what qualifications must 
be met for people to join the aristocracy. Wilson would argue that given these 
ambiguities, the Founders’ conception of an aristocracy should not be implemented. 
 In great contrast to the Founder’s vision of an aristocracy, for Wilson ([1885] 
1965, 170), the common man is the most suitable to be president. In Wilson’s ([1913] 
1961, 59, 62) opinion, the common person is the one who possesses real wisdom because 
it is the common person who is acquainted with the actual realities of life. According to 
Wilson ([1909] 1925, 95-96), a man of the people is preferable as a president because 
political figures are too limited in their worldview. Wilson’s ([1909] 1925, 95-96) 
reasoning behind this claim is that because political figures have too long and too deeply 
been focused on political matters, a man of the people is preferable because he has not 
been overly steeped in one field of study.  
 On the other hand, Wilson did not desire just any ordinary person to be president. 
For Wilson ([1885] 1965, 170), the common man ought to gain preparatory experience 
prior to becoming the president. Wilson ([1885] 1965, 170) put forth that in the same way 
that the commercial trades require effort and preparation, so too does administration and 
legislation. Thus for Wilson ([1885] 1965, 170), it is commendable that the nation has 
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training grounds for future presidents that are in the form of less major offices, such as 
state governorships.   
 For Wilson, the common man must first gain political experience to be president 
because of the difficulty of the office. Wilson’s (1916, 66) example of the difficulty of 
the presidency is the constant need for the president to be making appointments to other 
governmental offices. Wilson (1916, 66) also points out that the executive office is 
difficult because of the sheer number of people wishing to correspond with the president. 
 Wilson differs from the Founders in that he did not desire any distinction of class 
or social status (Wilson [1913] 1961, 25). Wilson wrote that the common people know 
their own interests better than do a small group of people ([1913] 1961, 49-50). Wilson 
([1913] 1961, 51-52) asserts that no special class can understand the interests of the 
people at large and no amount of wisdom or patriotism on the part of the small group of 
people could change this fact.   
 The Founders could argue that Wilson’s preference for the common man to be 
president does not solve the problem of the executive office requiring the ability of the 
president to represent all social brackets. The Founders would make this argument 
because if the president is to be the representative of all people like Wilson ([1913] 1961, 
81) sees him, the president must be able to sufficiently represent the interests of people 
from all social brackets. As mentioned above, Wilson’s view was that the common man 
has the most accurate perceptions of the country ([1913] 1961, 59, 62). The Founders 
would likely grant that the common man is not insulated from some harsh conditions like 
wealthier, upper-class people might be. On the other hand, the Founders would point out 
that the common man may also be insulated from problems that are unique to wealthier, 
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upper-class people. It appears that regardless of what social bracket the president is from, 
this individual will have incomplete knowledge of the conditions facing other social 
brackets due to not having lived in those precise social conditions themselves. Since it is 
difficult to represent that which someone does not intimately know, this lack of 
knowledge may interfere with the president’s ability to be the true representative of all 
people as Wilson sees him.  
 Moreover, the Founders would argue that an aristocracy would be the sole group 
with the education and experience necessary to properly govern the nation. The Founders 
would question Wilson’s assertion that the common man is the best suited to be president 
because Wilson makes it without sufficient evidence. The Founders would not want the 
presidential selection system to be based on an asserted statement that is not furnished 
with evidence to support it.  
SECTION 3  
 On the matter of presidential selection, the third major difference between the 
Founding Fathers and Woodrow Wilson is on the desirability of political parties. James 
MacGregor Burns (1963, 27) points out that Madison, Hamilton, and Jefferson were 
opposed to political parties. The overwhelming majority of the Founders were against 
political parties and saw them as a danger to the regime (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 77). The 
Founders saw the nation as a united whole, with the only ‘party’ being the group 
supporting the new Constitution (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 77). Thus the Founders wanted the 
nation’s politics to be nonpartisan. Woodrow Wilson ([1913] 1961, 75) was also against 
parties as formal institutions. Instead, Wilson was a proponent of informal parties (Ceaser 
[1979] 1980, 198-199). These informal parties would be temporary organizations that 
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would form to support a single specific candidate, carrying out tasks in support of that 
specific candidate (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 198-199). 
 The first reason the Founders preferred nonpartisanship was because they 
believed that partisanship would cause the people to come to be loyal to their party rather 
than to the nation as a whole (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 92). The Founders would argue that 
partisanship is inherently divisive, threatening the spirit of unity throughout the nation.  
Madison (Federalist 9 [1788] 2009, 39) points out that it was party rage that disrupted the 
petty republics of Greece and Italy. The Founders would agree with Ceaser’s ([1979] 
1980, 92) point that the very act of parties aggressively competing with each other creates 
conflict that would not exist without the existence of parties. The Founders would likely 
argue that party fighting would hinder constructively distributing information and 
clarifying complicated issues.  
 The second reason that the Founders preferred nonpartisanship is they saw 
partisanship as binding its members to certain positions, creating a conflict of interest 
once party members began serving as government officials (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 92-93). 
In the case of the president, his partisan ties would restrict him from fully making 
decisions based off of unbiased deliberation (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 93). This is so because, 
for every decision that the president makes, he would need to consider if it would 
strengthen or weaken his ties with his party. The president’s relationship with his party is 
significant because it will affect his re-election, the election of his successor from the 
same party, and his ability to cooperate with Congress. This conflict of interest interferes 
with the president being able to fully carry out his duties for the best interests of the 
nation.  
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 Like the Founders, Wilson was also against permanent political parties but instead 
of supporting nonpartisanship, he desired informal political parties. By the time 
Woodrow Wilson was elected, political parties had already been well established in 
United States politics. Wilson believed that in his time, political power had become 
concentrated in the hands of parties, organizations beholden to neither the government 
nor the people (Wilson 1910, 591-592). For Wilson ([1913] 1961, 133-134) this state of 
affairs was problematic because he believed that the parties promoted their own interests 
at the expense of the interests of the people. Wilson (1897, 352) argued that the president 
is not a proper leader because he is inhibited by his party platform from being an 
effective leader (Wilson 1897, 352). Wilson thought simply reforming the parties was 
inadequate (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 201) and he ([1913] 1961, 75) wanted to do away with 
the existing parties altogether. An additional reason Wilson ([1884] 1925, 109) wanted to 
rid the nation of the formal political parties was because he believed that they were 
steeped in outdated issues and principles.  
 Wilson was not a proponent of nonpartisanship. In Wilson’s ([1913] 1961, 133) 
view, organizations are legitimate and necessary to advance a great cause. Wilson saw 
the emergence of parties as a natural evolution of the political regime established by the 
Founders (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 171). For Wilson ([1879] 1925, 36), leadership requires 
followers. Therefore, in order for the president to be a proper leader, he must have a party 
([1879] 1925, 36). For Wilson ([1879] 1925, 36), the health of free political institutions 
relies on party rivalry. This is so because representative government is government by the 
majority and to be a government by majority, there must be party government ([1884] 
1925, 108). 
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 In place of permanent formal parties or nonpartisanship, Wilson supported parties 
as temporary informal organizations (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 198-199). In the sense that 
Wilson wanted a party, a party would be defined as an informal organization that forms 
around a candidate and is dedicated to helping that candidate carry out his governing plan 
should that candidate be victorious in the election (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 170, 198). The 
objective of these party members is to advance the principles of their party leader 
(Wilson [1884] 1925, 122). This informal party would perform duties that would help the 
candidate, acting as a supporting body for the candidate’s activities (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 
198-199). Wilson would agree with Herbert Croly’s (1914, 342) definition of a party as a 
voluntary association for the advancement of particular political and economic 
objectives.  
 As a way to respond to the Founders’ concern that people would become loyal to 
their party rather than to the nation, Wilson would argue that his conception of parties as 
temporary organizations resolves this concern. Wilson could argue that since the parties 
in his conception would be only transient, the parties may not exist long enough for 
people to become loyal to their party rather than to the nation. The Founders would likely 
respond that despite the shorter duration of party existence, the people could still be loyal 
to their party rather than to their nation.    
 Wilson could argue that his conception of parties as informal organizations 
resolves the Founders’ concern that there will be a conflict of interest between the 
president serving the interests of his party and serving the interests of the nation as a 
whole because the president’s party exists to serve him. Wilson would argue that in this 
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relationship, the president is not tied to the will of the party but instead the party is tied to 
president’s will. 
 The Founders would likely respond that because the party helped the president be 
victorious in the election, the party would expect that the president would promote the 
interests of the party. Thus the president would still have a conflict of interest because he 
cannot alienate his party members too much as he pursues the good of the nation as a 
whole.  
 Wilson would charge that the Founders should have foreseen that if they did not 
endorse political parties as informal groups then permanent parties with their concomitant 
evils would emerge. For Wilson, parties were a natural progression of the political system 
of the nation (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 199, 171). The Founders could defend themselves by 
saying that parties were not an inevitable development but rather were the result of 
Jefferson’s actions in the so-called Revolution of 1800 and the deliberate attempts of 
Martin Van Buren to create a permanent party system (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 84). While 
Jefferson became the founder of an enduring political party, this was accidental 
(Mansfield [1971] 2011, 75). For Jefferson, a party was only to be a temporary 
organization of persons to react to an emergency governmental situation (Mansfield 
[1971] 2011, 75). 
 The Founders would argue against Wilson’s informal parties by asserting that the 
existence of parties of any sort would be divisive, placing people in opposing groups, 
which would threaten the sense of unity in the nation. The Founders could argue that 
voters whom would not have been against the president despite disagreeing with him, 
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may end up opposing even the best of the president’s ideas merely because of partisan 
ties (Ceaser [1979] 1980, 92-93).  
 Wilson could counter that even in a system without political parties of any sort, 
there will still be those who oppose the president because they were against the president 
before he got elected. The Founders may grant Wilson this point but would respond that 
the existence of parties would make this opposition all the more powerful because the use 
of party labels makes more tangible the natural segmentation of different people into 
different groups, engendering tribalism. 
 The Founders could then proceed to point out that a nonpartisan president 
augments the sense of legitimacy the executive office must hold for the nation to be a 
stable regime. In a party system, there are independents that invariably see the president 
as merely a partisan actor, causing them to never fully accept him as their leader (Ceaser 
[1979] 1980, 99-100). The Founders would point out that a nonpartisan president avoids 
this problem and that Wilson’s informal parties still make it so the president would be 
perceived as a partisan actor by those not in the same party as the president, weakening 
some people’s perception of the president’s legitimacy. A lack of legitimacy is 
problematic because it leads to unrest and enough unrest eventually topples governments. 
The Founders would argue that nonpartisanship has an advantage over Wilson’s plan 
because, under a nonpartisan system, the president can more easily be seen as the 
legitimate leader of the whole nation, rather than just a leader of a party.   
CONCLUSION 
 The Founders and Wilson differed on the topic of presidential selection in three 
significant ways. The first is that the Founders had a preference for separate state 
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conventions where electors would vote for a president while Wilson had a preference for 
direct national primaries. The second is that the Founders thought that the president 
should be selected from a political aristocracy whereas Wilson wanted the president to be 
a common man that had sufficient political experience. The third difference is that the 
Founders did not desire the presence of political parties in the nation whereas Wilson 
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Appendix on Faith and Learning 
 Since I am blessed enough to know about and have access to God’s Word, 
Christian beliefs influence all that I do. I have committed to being a Christian and 
therefore strive to study things that are useful to the advancement of God’s Kingdom. 
Through this Honors Project, I seek to honor God. I believe that academia can glorify 
God because studying leads to a deeper understanding of the things that make up God’s 
creation.    
 The 2008 Presidential Election was the beginning of my interest in Political 
Science. In the years since then, I have paid attention to many and various debates about 
United States politics. Needless to say, the debates I’ve heard over the years have been 
intellectually stimulating and have sparked my interest in Political Science, so much so 
that I am minoring in it. 
 What drew me to the topic was the allure of an intellectual exercise. Researching 
both the Founding Fathers’ and Woodrow Wilson’s views and amalgamating information 
was an exercise in careful note taking and juggling information. This process has made 
me greatly mature as a researcher and as a scholar. Both the Founders and Wilson are 
commendable for their attempt at creating a just selection method that would furnish the 
people with the best president possible. My belief is that God wants us all to be the best 
that we can be. The Founders and Wilson both suggested what they thought was best for 
the nation. I think this idea of trying to find an optimal method for presidential selection 
is in line with God’s desire for humans to live in the best society possible. I think God 
would commend the attempt to create the optimal presidential election system. 
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 The present system for electing the president in the United States may not be the 
optimal one but I hope that this essay has illuminated the strengths and weaknesses of 
Founder’s method and Wilson’s method. I hope that the reader will be able to make a 
more informed choice about what could be the optimal presidential selection system. I 
also hope that this essay has caused the reader to become interested in American political 
theory regardless of whether or not they have had previous exposure to the field. The 
reader can decide for himself or herself just how right or wrong it is for a presidential 
selection system to differ from the Founders.    
 The “Defining Scholarship” article by Douglas and Rhonda Jacobsen teaches that 
scholars do things for “the betterment of others”. Jesus taught compassion and love for 
the poor, which requires selfless acts. In my opinion, it is my duty as a Christian scholar 
to have an Honors Project that makes the circumstances of other people’s lives even 
better. Helping the journey to find the optimal presidential selection system promotes 
justice for all. Additionally, the article states that the “primary task of scholarship is to 
“pay attention” to the world-or, at least, to some part of the world-with a sense of focus, 
care, and intensity that non-scholars lack” (Doug and Rhonda Jacobsen). As someone 
who is always seeking intellectual stimulation, this most certainly applies to me because I 
am very dedicated to being focused and passionately caring for others. Through this 
project, I hope to also spark interest in the presidential selection system and help allow 
the people to become more interested in politics and voting. The people of this country 
are fortunate enough to have opportunities to vote and I hope this project has helped 
create increased political participation in general.  
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 The “Application” portion of Scholarship Reconsidered by Ernest Boyer and the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of teaching also has greatly related to my life. 
I agree wholeheartedly with its sentiment of asking how knowledge can be “responsibly 
applied to problems”. As an avid reader, the books I enjoy much more than the rest are 
the ones that are the most applicable to my life and the advancement of achieving my 
goals. While a book I read may intellectually stimulating, the reading’s impact on me will 
be shallow if there is not some way that I can apply this material. This project was written 
to help the search for the best possible presidential system that can be used as well as 
spark interest in political theory 
 Another faith model that I found was of particular relevance to me was Chapter 6: 
“Two Ideals of Knowledge” of The Sacred & the Secular University. The chapter ends 
with a quote attributed to William Torrey Harris that rejoices “in the fact of the increased 
popularity of the university in both of its functions-that of culture and that of 
specialization” (Roberts and Turner 106). This quote celebrates the fact that different 
academic disciples have become specialized and that there is also a common curriculum. 
My concern about academic disciplines being specialized is that they become 
inaccessible to laymen. This quote caused me to realize that the problem with our 
political processes is not that no one can understand them but rather few make the 
attempt. I think this is because people are unaware of the intellectual pleasure that can be 
experienced by studying politics and political theory. 
 Through this project, I hope to make the presidential selection system of the 
Founders and Wilson easy to understand and by doing so, prove that politics is capable of 
being understood by many people rather than just pundits. I think that by making these 
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two methods easy to understand, it will raise awareness of how U.S. political systems 
theory works which in turn may be thought provoking to voters. I picture the ideal 
scholar as someone who is willing to explain his or her field to someone ignorant of it. In 
my own case, I strive to make my intellectual accomplishments accessible to both 
scholars as well as nonscholars. I believe this inclusiveness is exactly what Jesus 
preached. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
